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Turco: Torts--Governmental Immunity in West Virginia--Long Live the King

TORTS-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN
WEST VIRGINIA-LONG LIVE THE KING?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The enormous expansion of governmental activity in providing goods and services prompts a need for re-examination of the
obligation of government to compensate individuals for injuries
which occur in the course of the government's activities. At the
federal level, some assumption of responsibility for compensating
losses caused by federal employees was brought about by the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946.' At the state level, however, the
concept of governmental immunity from tort liability has remained firmly entrenched. While some states, pursuant to the
federal approach, have taken steps to examine and abrogate governmental or sovereign immunity, West Virginia is among those
states which continue to adhere to the doctrine. 2 This note will
delineate the basis for the governmental immunity doctrine in
West Virginia by examining its sources, limitations imposed by
statutes and judicial decisions, possible ways of avoiding the effects of the doctrine as it presently exists, and factors to be considered with regard to an eventual abolition of the doctrine.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The common law doctrine of governmental immunity arose
under the English monarchical system where the king, as sover'28

U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80.

'Governmental immunity has been judicially abrogated in:
Alaska
Indiana
New Jersey
Ohio
Kentucky
Arizona
Pennsylvania
Louisiana
California
Rhode Island
Michigan
Colorado
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Florida
Idaho
Nebraska
District of Columbia
Illinois
Nevada
The doctrine has been statutorily abrogated in:
Hawaii
Oregon
Iowa
Utah
Oklahoma
Washington
New York
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A, at 12-20 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1974

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 10

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

eign, possessed the personal privilege of immunity3-"the king can
do no wrong." The sovereign was deemed incapable of acting unlawfully or improperly. As a practical matter, no court could obtain jurisdiction over the sovereign because jurisdiction, in the
sense that it constitutes power, presupposed a power superior to
that of the king.'
When a personified sovereign exists, the personal privilege of
immunity can logically apply because the sovereign is a single,
ascertainable entity. Under a non-monarchical system of government such as the American system, however, the concept of immunity is inconsistent with the basic democratic premise that
there is no sovereign power except as it resides in the people collectively.
The initial appearance of governmental immunity in the
American legal system occurred in an 1812 Massachusetts case.
The defendant, in Mower v. Leicester,7 was an incorporated county
which derived financial support from taxation. In dealing with the
question of the county's liability for the tortious conduct of its
employees in repairing a highway, the court relied on the English
decision of Russell v. Men of Devon' where a county was deemed
not liable for an injury caused by its failure to repair a bridge.
However, the county in Russell, unlike that in Mower, was without
the available funds to pay for any damages it caused. As a practical matter, it was judgment-proof, and the court, recognizing this
disability, awarded judgment in the county's favor. The decision
evidenced no reliance on the premise that "the king can do no
wrong" nor on any rationale other than the county's inability to
pay any judgment levied against it. The Mower court's reliance on
Russell as a basis for its own reasoning appears misplaced owing
to the lack of similarity between the financial situation of the two
counties involved. The theory behind the holding in Russell would
seem to lend no support to a finding of immunity in Mower. Yet,
the Massachusetts court attempted to justify its decision against
3Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25).
This series of articles presents the first in-depth study of the subject of governmental immunity.
1
1d. at 4.
'Id. at 5.

'Id.
79 Mass. 247 (1812).

'100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
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liability by construing the county as a state agency entitled to
immunity.
On the basis of this poorly reasoned American decision, which
utilized an inapplicable English case, the concept of sovereign
immunity became a part of American common law. Apparently,
there was never any direct link between the English idea of the
immunity of the sovereign and American case law because no English decision upon which an American court relied was ever based
on the idea that "the king can do no wrong."
Following the Mower decision, and despite the lack of a rational foundation based on English law, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was reiterated in subsequent American cases, both state
and federal.' In addition to its adoption into case law, governmental immunity has been embodied in some state statutes and constitutions. Such codification has raised questions with regard to the
ability of courts to abrogate the doctrine. This problem is of particular importance in West Virginia where constitutional sanction
presents one of the greatest barriers to potential abrogation.
III.

FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF IMMUNITY IN WEST VIRGINIA

A.

Legal Basis

The immunity of the State of West Virginia is derived from
two sources-the constitutional and statutory incorporation of the
common law into the law of West Virginia and the constitutional
provision granting immunity from suit to the State. Sovereign
immunity appears to have been a part of the English common law
in 1863, at the time of the original enactment of the predecessor
of chapter two, article one, section one of the West Virginia Code,
whereby all parts of the common law which were neither inconsistent with the constitution nor repealed by the Legislature were
adopted as the law of the State.5 Following this enactment, a
'E.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); Hill v. United
States, 50 U.S. 386, 389 (1850); State v. Hill, 54 Ala. 67 (1875); Lewis v. State, 96
N.Y. 71 (1884).
There appears to have been no abrogation of the doctrine from the time of
the decision in Russell v. Men of Devon until the enactment of the predecessor of
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-1-1 (1971 Replacement Volume), which reads:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the principles
of the Constitution of this State, shall continue in force within the same,
except in those respects wherein it was altered by the general assembly
of Virginia before the twentieth day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-
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provision for the adoption of the common law into the West Virginia constitution was ratified." There is no evidence of the abrogation of the doctrine either in England or in the State of Virginia
12
prior to this time.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has interpreted
both the statutory and constitutional provisions as granting the
Legislature sole power to change the common law so adopted by
the State.'3 This interpretation seems to indicate that the court has
exceeded its power in cases decided since 1863 to the extent the
immunity doctrine has been construed to vary from its early English construction. Absent legislative change, the court should be
bound by the common law as it existed in 1863, the time of the
adoption of article VIII, section 21 of the West Virginia constitution. Only in situations where the common law has been changed
by statute-e.g., the imposition of liability for failure to keep
streets in repair"-has there been a valid exercise of power to
change this law. Therefore, governmental immunity, to the extent
three, or has been, or shall be, altered by the legislature of this State.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-1-1 (1971 Replacement Volume) is to be read in pari
materia with W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 21 which states:

Such parts of the common law, and of the laws of this State as are in force
when this article goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto; shall
be and continue the law of the State until altered or repealed by the

legislature. All civil and criminal suits and proceedings pending in the
former circuit courts of this State, shall remain and be proceeded in
before the circuit courts of the counties in which they were pending.
The effective date of the enactment is 1880, but it has been conjectured that the
date apparently followed by the courts as the base date is 1872 since the provision
was substantially carried over from Article VIII, § 36 of the constitution of 1863 and
embodied in the constitution of 1872. Cady, Law of Products Liability in West
Virginia, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 283, 294 & n.40 (1971).
'"A Virginia case, Richmond v. Long's Adm'rs, 17 Gratt. 383 (1867), applied

the doctrine to a municipal corporation which maintained a city hospital. A slaveowner whose slave had died while he was being treated at the hospital was denied
recovery.
3
'1
Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 338, 127 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1962). The case
involved a wife's attempt to maintain an action for loss of consortium. The opinion

states:
It is clear, from the constitutional provisions and the statute pertaining

thereto, that the legislature has the power to change the common law,
and inasmuch as it has not done so in connection with the question
involved in this case, the common law relating thereto remains the law
of this State.
See also, Note, 71 W. VA. L. REv. 341 (1969).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17 (1966).
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that it is a common law doctrine adopted as a part of the State
constitution, is not within the power of the court to change.
B.

Nature and Scope of Constitutional Immunity

The other constitutional provision, which is the source of the
immunity of the State, is found in article VI, section 35, which
states:
The State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in
any court of law or equity, except the State of West Virginia,
including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein,
or any officer, agent, or employee thereof, may be made defendant in any garnishment or attachment proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee.
The immunity granted by article VI, section 35, has been interpreted by the court as an absolute exemption from suit, 5 its inclusion in the constitution placing it beyond change by the courts and
"The principle that the State could not be sued was stated as early as 1882 in
the case of Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Miller, 19 W. Va. 408 (1882). Article VI, § 35,
was apparently first cited for the proposition that the State acting through its
officers or agents, cannot be sued in Miller v. Board of Agriculture, 46 W. Va. 192,
32 S.E. 1007 (1899), where a writ of mandamus sought against a State board was
denied. The State's absolute immunity has been reiterated in a number of other
decisions by the court. Ward v. County Court, 141 W. Va. 730, 93 S.E.2d 44 (1956),
focused on the question of whether the Raleigh County Park Board, a public corporation, qualified for the immunity specified in W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35, because
it was either an agent, arm, or subdivision of the State. The court acknowledged
that while this entity may be construed as governmental in nature, its functions
were proprietary and, hence, it was not entitled to immunity. In Hamill v. Koontz,
134 W. Va. 439, 59 S.E.2d 879 (1950), a suit against the State tax commissioner
was held a suit against the State which was barred by the State's absolute immunity. The effect of the Hamill decision has since been circumvented by statutes
which provide the taxpayer with a remedy for challenging decisions made by the
State Tax Commissioner. See, for example, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-13-8 (1966),
which was held to be non-violative of W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 35, in Walter Butler
Bldg. Co. v. Soto, 142 W. Va. 616, 97 S.E.2d 275 (1957). Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126
W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944), applied the State's absolute immunity to a
municipal corporation while it was engaged in the performance of a "governmental"
activity. Stewart v. State Road Comm'n, 117 W. Va. 352, 353, 185 S.E. 567 (1936),
categorized the immunity provision as "absolute and unqualified" in denying a writ
of mandamus against a State agency. The "unqualified" nature of the State's
immunity was changed by an amendment to W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 35, in 1936
whereby garnishment and attachment proceedings against the State were authorized. Finally, Mahone v. State Road Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S.E. 320 (1925),
emphasized the extension of absolute immunity to agencies to which the state has
delegated performance of certain duties.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1974

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 10

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the Legislature.' 6 While the
the State as an entity, the
include State agencies and
acts or which have a direct

[Vol. 76

wording of the provision refers only to
court has interpreted the provision to
subdivisions through which the State
financial connection with the State. 7

The criteria for determining whether or not an agency of the
State qualifies for inclusion within the State immunity provision
appear to be of two basic types-financial and functional. The
financial criterion focuses on the monetary aspects of an agency's
maintenance-specifically, the source of the funds by which its
operations are supported. Thus, an institution supported entirely
by direct State funding through legislative appropriations is pro.
"Achange of W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35, would require compliance with the
procedural requirements of W. VA. CONST. art. XIV, § 2, concerning amendments
to the State constitution.
'7Kondos v. Board of Regents, 318 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.W. Va. 1970), recognized
the West Virginia Board of Regents as an arm of the State entitled to immunity
under W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 35, while engaged in the governmental function of
education. In Morgantown v. Ducker, 153 W. Va. 121, 168 S.E.2d 298 (1969), the
Board of Governors of West Virginia University was adjudged a State agency and,
hence, immune from suit. The opinion used six criteria to determine the Board's
immunity: (1) Its property was held in trust for the State; (2) it depended on the
State legislature for its financial support; (3) it performed duties which were the
same as those performed by the State Board of Control, a State agency; (4) it
performed a function which is properly a state responsibility; (5) a judgment
against it would adversely affect the rights of the State; (6) a judgment against it
would have to be paid from public funds. In Schippa v. Liquor Control Comm'n,
132 W. Va. 51, 53 S.E.2d 609 (1948), the court decided that the Liquor Control
Commission was an agency of the State and, therefore, immune from suit. The
opinion stated that "when the Legislature based its enactment for the control of
liquor traffic upon the police power of the State, it was certainly intended to bring
to the aid of such control the sovereign power of the State." In Miller v. Board of
Agriculture, 46 W. Va. 192, 32 S.E. 1007 (1899), the plaintiff sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the State Board of Agriculture to proceed with a contract
under which he was to do certain printing for the Board. The court denied the writ
on the ground that this suit was really a suit against the State. The court held that
the nature of the case presented from the record as a whole must be considered in
determining whether the State is an actual party. The fact that the suit is not
brought against the State by name is not controlling. If the State is the real party
against whom relief is sought and the judgment will operate, then the suit, even if
brought against agents or officers of the State, is, in truth, a suit against the State
itself. In Brown's Adm'r v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 704 (1890), the court
recognized that the State's governmental powers are exercised not only by itself but
also by municipal and quasi-municipal organizations, such as cities, towns, counties, and boards, "to which . . . the state delegates portions of its sovereignty to
be exercised within particular portions of territory for certain well-defined public
purposes."
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tected by the immunity rule." Likewise, when all monies received
by an entity are channeled through the State treasury, the entity
is immune.'" A notable distinction is made when the source of
operational funds is self-liquidating revenue bonds. 21 In such a
case, where no direct connection with State funds is established,
immunity is denied. 2' The rationale for extending the immunity of
the State to its financially dependent agencies is based on the
impracticality of having to satisfy judgments out of public monies,
thereby depleting the State
treasury of the means for carrying on
22
its multiple functions.
The second criterion-that of determining whether an entity
is a State agency by examination of its functional aspects-focuses
on the activities performed by the entity. If such activities are ones
which are properly the obligation and responsibility of the State,
"E.g., Barber v. Spencer State Hosp., 95 W. Va. 463, 121 S.E. 497 (1924), where

a claim against a state psychiatric hospital which received State monies and was
subject to the State Board of Control, a State agency (see note 17 supra), was held
a claim against the State and, hence, barred by the State's immunity.
"Morgantown v. Ducker, 153 W. Va. 121, 168 S.E.2d 298 (1969). In addition
to other criteria used by the court to determine that the immunity of W. VA. CONST.
art. VI, § 35, applied, the court discussed the financial support of the Board of
Governors of West Virginia University. It determined that the Board was entirely
dependent on legislative appropriations and that all monies it received-e.g.,
tuition fees and hospital fees-were paid directly into the State treasury, and were,
in effect, public funds. Not only was the Board maintained by direct government
funding, but its own collected revenues were placed directly into the State coffers.
Hence, the judgment sought would have had to have been paid from funds in the
State treasury, and the interest of the State would have been directly affected
thereby. The court concluded by awarding a writ of mandamus requiring the court
of claims to assume jurisdiction over this claim against the State.
"Self-liquidating revenue bonds are repaid with funds generated by the agency
which issued them. For example, in the case of the West Virginia Turnpike Commission, funds collected as tolls from turnpike users are used to repay bond indebtedness.
" 1Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Turnpike Comm'n, 143 W. Va. 913, 105 S.E.2d 630
(1958). Even though road construction is properly a governmental function, it does
not entitle the Turnpike Commission to the State's immunity if a dependency on
the State is not otherwise established. The court said:
The constitutional provision [W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35] does not limit
the power of the State to delegate governmental functions to quasi-public
corporations which have no taxing power or dependency upon the state
for their financial support or success. Yet such corporations are afforded
no immunity from suit or liability.
Id. at 926, 105 S.E.2d at 637. Where it was shown that the Turnpike Commission's
revenues were obtained from revenue bonds which it was authorized to issue, and
no direct financial link with the State was established, immunity was denied.
2Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233, 57 Am. R. 664 (1886).
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immunity may apply. Education, 21 construction and maintenance
of highways,2 4 control of liquor,7 and control of aviation," have all
been construed as proper obligations of the State, the performance
of which is entitled to immunity. 7 An examination of the court's
rationale in each of these cases reveals no ascertainable pattern of
reasoning or determinable factors whereby such categorization is
made.
Some corporate organizations, such as public hospitals and
2SIn Krutili v. Board of Educ., 99 W. Va. 466, 129 S.E. 486 (1925), a suit was
brought for injuries sustained by a pupil at a Weirton high school. The court
determined that school districts, the affairs of which are administered by boards
of education, are involuntary corporations organized solely for public benefit. The
court stated that since the board of education was created by the legislature to carry
out the constitutional mandate to provide for a system of free schools, it was
engaged in what has been universally recognized as a distinct governmental function, and was, therefore, entitled to immunity.
"Mahone v. State Road Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S.E. 320 (1925). Construction of public highways is the duty of the State, which, when delegated to an
agency, may entitle the agency to immunity under W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
Schippa v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 132 W. Va. 51, 53 S.E.2d 609 (1948).
2'Van Gilder v. Morgantown, 136 W. Va. 831, 68 S.E.2d 746 (1949). The court
examined the legislative act creating the West Virginia State Aeronautics Commission and determined that the State exercises absolute control over State and municipal airports as a valid assertion of its police power. Two sections of the act were
read in pari materia by the court. The rental of hangar space was expressly permitted by the act which also stated that the operation of airports and air navigation
facilities involved the exercise of a governmental function. The court determined
that the rental of hangar space, since it was incident to the operation of the airport,
could be included as a part of the exercise of a governmental function, thereby
entitling the performer-the municipality which operated the airport-to immunity.
,Hesse v. Soil Conservation Comm., 153 W. Va. 111, 168 S.E.2d 293 (1969).
This recent case involved an analysis of the meaning of "state agency." The court
dealt with the classification of two entities, the Soil Conservation Committee and
the Soil Conservation District. In determining that the Committee was a State
agency, the court applied the functional-financial criteria test used in its previous
decisions. In its examination of the District, however, the court used the definition
of State agency given in the statute which defines the jurisdiction of the court of
claims and which specifically excludes certain entities from classification as State
agencies. This was a novel approach and one which would seem to nullify earlier
decisions which categorized as State agencies some of the entities which are not
deemed State agencies for purposes of court of claims' jurisdiction. Two such decisions are Boice v. Board of Educ., 111 W. Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931), and Shaffer
v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp., 135 W. Va. 163, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950). It would be more
consistent with the pattern of reasoning exhibited by the court in its previous
decisions to regard this particular decision as a mistaken application of a definition
which was intended by the legislature to apply solely to the jurisdiction of the court
of claims.
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the State Road Commission, which are categorized as "public corporations," have also been afforded State immunity on the basis
of functions performed. These organizations are usually so classified because they are operated under a corporate format and engage in activities directed toward public-oriented, State-related
purposes. The term "public corporation" has, in some cases, been
used synonymously with "State agency." These "corporations"
are usually created by legislative acts which often grant authority
to sue and be sued. The court has often repudiated the express
liability included in the provisions creating State agencies" and
public corporations," reiterating the absolute nature of governmental immunity as it pertains to the State and charging the
powers by atLegislature with having exceeded its constitutional
3
tempting to authorize suits against such entities. 1
uA discussion of municipal corporations as distinguished from public corporations can be found in State ex rel. Koontz v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 131 W. Va.
417, 47 S.E.2d 689 (1948). See also Shaffer v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp., 135 W. Va.
163, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950).
2
Schippa v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 132 W. Va. 51, 53 S.E.2d 609 (1948). The
court stated:
Since our constitution was adopted there have been many boards and
commissions brought into being by the legislature, and many of them
termed corporations, with the provision that they might sue and be sued.
Generally speaking, these corporations have been treated as agencies of
the State, and suits against them not permitted.
Id. at 53, 53 S.E.2d at 610. The court apparently prefers to determine whether an
entity is entitled to immunity on the basis of other considerations-i.e., financial
and functional aspects of its operation-rather than on the words of the act creating
it. Shaffer v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp., 135 W. Va. 163, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950), involved the court's use of the terms "public corporation" and "governmental
agency" to refer to the same type of institution. In Stewart v. State Road Comm'n,
117 W. Va. 352, 185 S.E. 567 (1936), The State road commission, was deemed a
State agency, although categorized as a corporation by the act creating it. Boice v.
Board of Educ., 111 W. Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931), and other board of education
cases cited therein contain language which refers to boards of education as governmental agencies. A previous case, Krutili v. Board of Educ., 99 W. Va. 466, 129 S.E.
486 (1925), had referred to such entities as involuntary corporations working for a
public purpose.
3
IStewart v. State Road Comm'n, 117 W. Va. 352, 185 S.E. 567 (1936). The
court recognized that other jurisdictions have established corporate entities with
public funds and allowed suits to be maintained against them despite a constitutional provision prohibiting suita against the State. It refused, however, to follow
this line of authority, adhering instead to the absoluteness of W. VA. CONST. art.
VI, § 35, as it pertains to the State and its agencies.
3
ISchippa v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 132 W. Va. 51, 53 S.E.2d 609 (1948). Acts
of the 35th W. Va. Leg. ch. 4, Reg. Sess. (1935), whereby the Liquor Control
Commission was created, provided that it could sue and be sued. The court stated
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LIMITATIONS ON IMMUNITY IN WEST VIRGINIA

While the court has made attempts to include within the
State's immunity many agencies and corporate organizations
which perform functions for the public welfare and engage in activities which are a proper responsibility of the State, these entities
perform other activities which have not been so protected by the
immunity doctrine. The limitations afforded by this distinction of
activities may facilitate recovery for injuries caused by State
agents and officials.
A. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
While the immunity of the State itself, as expressed in article
VI, section 35, remains secure, the immunity of State agencies,
public corporations, and municipalities has been subjected to certain qualifications. Beginning with the case of Bailey v. New
York, 3 the common law recognized a distinction between activities
which are governmental and those which are proprietary. Although
the line of demarcation between these two types of activities is
often difficult to draw, and classifications vary from state to state,
some insight into the West Virginia viewpoint is afforded by Hayes
v. Cedar Grove, which set forth this general premise:
Any activity of the sovereign authority, or one to whom its
powers are delegated, is presumed to be governmental; and it
follows, we think, that if there be uncertainty as to the classification into which the particular activity falls, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of its being governmental rather than proprietary, for the reason that the usual function of government
is to act in the interest of the public as a whole. In such a case,
where no profit to the municipality is involved, its acts are
governmental. Generally speaking, it is only where it steps
aside, and in a sense, enters a zone of private business, or into
activities which may be and frequently are carried on through
private enterprises, that its activities become proprietary.,
The basic rationale is to provide immunity for those functions
which are performed for the common benefit of the public and to
that W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35, mandates that "the State of West Virginia shall
never be made defendant in any court of law or equity. . ." and held that it applied
in this case. Therefore, "the Legislature exceeded its Constitutional power when it
authorized suits against said commission." 132 W. Va. at 53, 53 S.E.2d at 610.
323 Hill, [N.Y.] 531 (1842).
3126 W. Va. 828, 835-36, 30 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1944).
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deny immunity where an entity engages
in activities for its own
34
benefit or from which it derives profit.
Tompkins v. Kanawha Board35 was one of the earliest cases in
which the court imposed liability on an entity which, though it was
engaged in activities related to a State purpose, was deemed to
have the same liabilities as a private corporate body engaging in a
business. The case involved an action brought against the Kanawha Board, a corporation created by the Legislature for the purpose of controlling and supervising the Kanawha River. Plaintiff
alleged that the Board's failure to keep the river free of obstructions caused the loss of plaintiffs barge and its cargo. The court
refused to allow the Board to escape liability for its actions, despite
the fact that it was created by the Legislature, and its property was
owned by the State. The court stated that "[i]t would be against
all our ideas of State government, if a corporation created by the
State to carry on a work of improvement should not be liable like
any other corporation for the damage it inflicted ...
."I' Immunity was denied because the court determined that "[s]overeignty
does not reside in such a corporation. The State cannot delegate
her sovereignty. There is no creature of the State above the law and
3 17
irresponsible.
The court's willingness to impose liability upon State agencies
became apparent in decisions following Tompkins where certain
activities were adjudged proprietary functions for which liability
accrued for injuries caused during their performance. Liability was
imposed on a municipal corporation for a death which resulted
from maintenance of a waterworks system. 38 In addition, the main'3Shafferv. Monongalia Gen. Hosp., 135 W. Va. 163, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950).
3119

W. Va. 257 (1881).

3"Id. at 264.
"Id. The language in this opinion conveys a reserved attitude on the part of
the court with regard to application of immunity to a State agency. Such an attitude did not prevail in later cases. In 1925, the court, in Mahone v. State Road
Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S.E. 320 (1925), distinguished Tompkins on the ground

that the entity there involved was not an agency having to do directly with the
administration of the State government and decided in favor of the application of
immunity to the State Road Commission. While the decision in Tompkins was not
based on the governmental-proprietary distinction, it indicated a willingness on the
part of the court to place limitations on the application of immunity and to impose
liability whenever an entity engaged in a function in its private, corporate capacity.
*'Wigal v. Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S.E. 554 (1914). A water tank owned
by the municipality burst, drowning plaintiff's intestate. The municipality argued

for immunity on the ground that maintenance of the waterworks served at least one
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tenance of a public park by a municipality authorized by charter,"
or by a commission created by the Legislature," has been held
proprietary. Activities recognized as governmental by the court, in
addition to those attributable to State agencies, have included
maintenance of a municipal jail,4 maintenance of equipment and
instrumentalities used for governmental purposes," municipal garbage collection which involved no charge to residents, 3 operation
purpose that was governmental in nature, for, in addition to providing water for
domestic purposes for which it collected a fee, the municipality also maintained the
waterworks system for the purely governmental purpose of providing fire protection
for the city's inhabitants. The court refused to accept this argument, finding in.
stead that, since the cause of action had not arisen as a result of the use of the
waterworks in a fire-extinguishing capacity, the municipality was liable to the same
extent as any private corporation maintaining such a waterworks. The fact that the
municipality charged a certain rate for providing water did not seem to be the
decisive variable. The court looked at the activity from the viewpoint of whether a
private corporation could have engaged in such an activity and, on this basis,
determined that it was proprietary in nature. But see the early case of Mendel v.
Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233, 57 Am. R. 664 (1886), in which the court held this type
of activity to be governmental.
"Warden v. Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375 (1925). The court seemed
influenced by a growing body of case law from other states with regard to municipal
parks. Most of these decisions imposed liability on the municipality for injuries to
individuals using the park. Language in the opinion also indicated that the court
recognized a distinction between activities engaged in by municipalities, which are
similar to those normally engaged in by the State government, and activities more
in the nature of conveniences and amusements, which are often a subject for private
enterprise.
'"Ward v. County Court, 141 W. Va. 730, 93 S.E.2d 44 (1956). The court cited
Warden v. Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375 (1925), and a later decision,
Ashworth v. Clarksburg, 118 W. Va. 476, 190 S.E. 763 (1937), where liability was
imposed on municipalities which maintained public parks. The court reasoned: "If
the function is proprietary when performed by a municipality, it is proprietary
when performed by such a corporation as the Raleigh County Park Board." 141 W.
Va. at 740, 93 S.E.2d at 49.
"Brown v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707 (1890). The court determined that, in its maintenance of a municipal jail, a municipality was entitled to
share in the State's immunity. This activity was viewed as one delegated to the
municipality by the State for the public benefit. Officers employed at the jail were
to be construed not as agents of the municipality but as agents of the "greater
public"-the State.
2
' Carder v. Clarksburg, 100 W. Va. 605, 131 S.E. 349 (1926). A child was killed
when brakes dislodged on a tractor owned by the City of Clarksburg for use in street
repair. The court found immunity because the tractor was maintained and used by
the city for the governmental purpose of road construction, even though, at the time
the injury occurred, it was not engaged in the performance of a governmental
activity.
' 3Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944). The court
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of a public hospital,44 rental of hangar space at an airport maintained by a municipality in conjunction with a State commission,45
maintenance of a municipal fire department," and maintenance
and repair of public roads by either a county" or a municipality"
wherein no liability for repair is imposed by statute.
construed garbage collection as a proper exercise of power under the home rule
provisions of the West Virginia Code. In addition, it was viewed as an extension of
the police power of the State. The fact that no fee was charged for this service was
further evidence that it was carried on in the municipality's governmental capacity
of providing for the public benefit rather than for any profit-making motive. Compare Wigal v. Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25,81 S.E. 554 (1914), where the maintenance
of a waterworks system by a municipality which imposed a fee on users was determined to be a proprietary function.
"Shaffer v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp., 135 W. Va. 163, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950). The
hospital was created by a legislative act and maintained as a public hospital. The
court viewed it as analogous to a public charity in that it was obligated to provide
for the health and welfare of the individual, regardless of his ability to pay. Hence,
its function was a governmental one of fulfilling the State's obligation to provide
for the public welfare, rather than a profit-making activity. Its dispensation of
services was not conditioned on payment of fees and any monies collected by it from
patients were utilized solely for maintenance and in building a reserve fund for
future expansion.
"Van Gilder v. Morgantown, 136 W. Va. 831, 68 S.E.2d 746 (1949). In this case,
as in Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 12 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944), the court
construed the activity engaged in by the municipality as an extension of the State's
police power.
"Cawley v. Board of Trustees, 138 W. Va. 571, 76 S.E.2d 683 (1953).
19Douglass Adm'r v. County Court, 90 W. Va. 47, 110 S.E. 439 (1922). Plaintiff's
intestate was killed upon being thrown from his wagon when his horse was frightened by the approach of defendant's truck. Since the truck was held to be an
instrumentality used for the governmental purpose of construction, maintenance,
and repair of public highways, no liability for negligence was imposed. Plaintiff
argued that the fact that the truck was being driven at a high rate of speed made
the road unsafe and within the definition of "out of repair" as defined by a statute
imposing liability for failing to maintain public highways adequately. The court,
however, rejected this contention and denied recovery. The opinion did not indicate
the purpose for which the truck was being used at the time the injury occurred-i.e.,
whether it was engaged in the performance of a governmental function. The fact
that the truck was being driven at a high rate of speed and on the wrong side of
the road, likewise, did not seem to influence the court in making its decision.
"Jones v. Mannington, 148 W. Va. 583, 136 S.E.2d 882 (1964). Absolute liability is imposed on a municipality for permitting its streets or sidewalks to fall out
of repair. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17 (1966), creates a liability which did not exist
at common law, since maintenance of public streets was construed as a governmental function. The Jones case exemplifies the court's unwillingness to broaden the
scope of liability imposed by the statute. A strict, almost literal, interpretation was
given to the words "out of repair" and recovery was not allowed where a mere
dangerous obstruction or nuisance existed on a public road. The particular fact
situation in Jones apparently also influenced the court's refusal to impose liability.
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The Ministerial-Discretionary Distinction

In addition to the governmental-proprietary distinction,
which has been used primarily to limit the scope of immunity
granted to municipalities, another qualification of activities has
been used to limit the immunity of public officers. An attempt has
been made by some courts to separate the activities performed by
policemen, prosecuting attorneys, school board members and other
public officers into those acts which are ministerial and those
which are discretionary or quasi-judicial in nature." Discretionary
activities-those activities involving the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment - are entitled to immunity as long as they
are performed honestly and in good faith 0 In contrast, where specific duties to act are imposed by virtue of an officer's particular
job or position, these duties are deemed to be ministerial acts for
which liability will accrue if improperly performed, regardless of
whether they are performed honestly and in good faith."
West Virginia has applied this distinction to activities involving municipalities as well as to public officers. Thus, when a municipality is charged with the performance of a certain definable
duty, liability accrues to the municipality for its own negligence
and impropriety as well as for the improper performance by its
municipal officers. When an activity is discretionary, however, the
municipality, both for its own exercise of discretion and that of its
municipal officers, is relieved of liability and entitled to immunity.
Few tort cases in West Virginia have dealt with the ministerial-discretionary distinction. 52 Those that have mentioned this
analysis have combined it with the governmental-proprietary distinction. In Gibson v. Huntington, the court categorized a municiA boulder fell from privately owned property onto a right of way located between
the public road and the private property. Even though the municipality had previously cleared fallen rocks from the right of way, the court determined that this
was not such an exercise of control as to make the right of way a part of the public
road system. Compare Gibson v. Huntington, 38 W. Va. 177, 18 S.E. 447 (1893),
an early decision in which liability was imposed on a municipality for death of an
infant caused by a cave-in of a dangerous embankment adjacent to the public road.
"'W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 987 (4th ed. 1971), contains a general discussion of the scope of immunity of public officers.
11Id. at 989.
11Id. at 990.
"State ex rel. Printing-Litho, Inc. v. Wilson, 147 W. Va. 415, 128 S.E.2d 449
(1962), was not a tort case, but the court discussed the ministerial-discretionary
distinction.
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pality's use of a natural embankment as a barrier between a public
road and a creek as imposing on the municipality a "ministerial
duty, neither governmental nor discretionary, to see that it [the
embankment] was not dangerous to anyone lawfully using the
road or any part thereof." ' 5 In Charlestonv. Belier, the court reiterated this dual analysis by stating:
In its governmental capacity, a municipality is strictly a branch
of the State government, within the extent of its limitations,
both as to territory and powers granted. And in the discharge
of their duties, governmental and discretionary, its officers are
public officers for whose acts the municipality is in no wise
liable.5'
While there is arguably no relationship between the two methods
of categorization, the case for liability is strengthened since each
of the tests applies separately and distinctly to a given activity.
Because of the dearth of West Virginia case law defining criteria
used by the court to distinguish between ministerial duties and
discretionary activities, decisions of courts of other states are helpful. 55
C.

The Influence of Insurance

The acquisition of liability insurance by the State removes an
important rationale for the existence of governmental immunity,
that is, preventing the depletion of the public treasury. Likewise,
the purchase of insurance seems to abrogate by implication the
absolute immunity defined in article VI, section 35, of the State
constitution since only if the State were subject to liability would
the purchase of insurance be a necessary and justified expenditure
of public funds.
Authorization for the establishment of a program of State insurance is found in the West Virginia Code. The authorization
statute contains a provision barring an insurer from using the con138 W. Va. 177, 179, 18 S.E. 447, 448 (1893).
5445 W. Va. 44, 48, 30 S.E. 152, 153 (1898).

uSee, e.g., Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27
(1970); Mower v. Williams, 334 Ill. App. 16, 78 N.E.2d 529 (1948), and cases collected; W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 987-92 (4th ed. 1971).
-'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12-5 (1971 Replacement Volume) provides: "Any
policy of insurance purchased or contracted for by the [state insurance] board
shall provide that the insurer shall be barred and estopped from relying upon the
constitutional immunity of the State of West Virginia against claims or suits."
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stitutional immunity of the State as a defense against claims or
suits. This provision, attempting to justify maintenance of the
State insurance program, appears to constitute an attempt at legislative modification of the absolute immunity afforded to the
State by article VI, section 35. Yet, in Cunningham v. County
Court, the court stated that the purchase of insurance by a county
court had no effect on its status as an immune entity." State ex
5
rel Scott v. Taylor"
seems to indicate, however, that insurance
does have at least a potentially influential effect. The parties in
this case agreed to a stipulation whereby plaintiffs expressed a
willingness to limit their recovery to fifty thousand dollars-the
amount available from insurance policies held by the State-in
return for the Attorney General's agreement to withdraw a motion
to dismiss based on the State's sovereign immunity. This, in effect,
constituted a waiver of immunity by the State to the extent of its
insurance coverage." Had the State not agreed to waive its constitutional immunity and permit a suit to be maintained, it would
have been admitting that its purchase of the insurance policies was
a fruitless expenditure. While the court did not deal with the validity of the Code provisions establishing the State's insurance program, the Attorney General may have waived immunity to the
extent of insurance coverage to avoid a potential lawsuit against
the State for an illegal expenditure of funds. Taylor indicates that
the influence of insurance on State immunity is at present an
unresolved issue surrounded by gross inconsistencies.
The insurance provision and the decision in Taylor may be
means of curbing the extent of the State's immunity. Under this
rationale, if the State is found liable, the injured party would be
entitled to recover, at least to the extent of the State's insurance
coverage. Thus, the State insurance dilemma provides potential
grounds for abrogating the immunity doctrine and obtaining relief
for an injured client. The key questions raised by Taylor are: (1)
11148 W. Va. 303, 134 S.E.2d 725 (1964). See also Boice v. Board of Educ., 111
W. Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931), in which the purchase of insurance by a board of
education was held insufficient to change the board's status as a governmental
agency entitled to immunity.
11152 W. Va. 151, 160 S.E.2d 146 (1968).
5
Since the State's constitutional immunity has been construed to be absolute,
and case law has interpreted this absoluteness to preclude waiver by the Legislature, it appears that the Legislature may have exceeded its powers by attempting
to achieve through a legislative enactment what can only rightfully be changed by
a constitutional amendment.
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Is the clause which prohibits an insurer of the State from asserting
governmental immunity as a defense a valid exercise of the Legislature's power, constituting a genuine waiver of the immunity
established in article VI, section 35; and (2) if constitutional immunity is absolute and incapable of being abrogated by legislative
enactment, is there a legal basis for the continued expenditure of
funds for the State insurance program?
D.

The Concept of a Moral Obligation

The most well-known limitation on governmental immunity
in West Virginia is the recognition of a moral obligation by the
State through its court of claims." When an injury is caused by
agents or employees of the State who are engaged in governmental
activities, a valid moral obligation may be incurred by the State,
thus justifying compensation of the injured party through an appropriation of public funds.' This means of obtaining relief, however, is not without severe limitations.
Two basic criteria are used in determining whether a claim
ought to be paid: (1) The legal liability of the State must be shown;
and, (2) depending on the type of claim, either negligence or
breach of contract must be established.12 A claim brought before
"W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1 et seq. (1972 Replacement Volume). The court of
claims is a creature of the State Legislature established to deal with claims brought
against the State and State agencies within the court's jurisdiction. The recovery
procedure is initiated by filing written notice of a claim with the clerk of the court.
The clerk sends a copy of the notice to the State agency involved and to the
Attorney General, and the claim is docketed for hearing. Negotiations between the
aggrieved party and the Attorney General's office take place prior to the hearing
so that stipulations can be made a part of the record. Briefs can be filed with the
court on any questions involved. Following presentation of arguments by both sides,
a decision is rendered. The Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the court except where
they conflict with the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the court of claims. Rules
of evidence, both common law and statutory, are not binding on the court.
8'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13 (1972 Replacement Volume) provides for the
satisfaction of claims "which the State as a sovereign commonwealth should in
equity and good conscience discharge and pay." The West Virginia court has called
the State's responsibility to a claimant a "moral obligation" but has analyzed it
from the legal perspective of liability incurred by failure to perform a "duty" owed
to the claimant. See Price v. Sims, 134 W. Va. 173, 58 S.E.2d 657 (1950), State ex
rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
62W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13 (1972 Replacement Volume). Grateful acknowledgment is made of the assistance of Ms. Cheryle M. Hall, clerk of the court of
claims, in obtaining information concerning implementation of the statute and
procedural aspects of the court's activities.
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the court for consideration can have one of three possible' outcomes. First, the court can approve the claim and present it to the
Legislature in a claims bill. Subcommittees of the Senate Finance
Committee and House Finance Committee can add their approval,
and the claim will be paid by the State Auditor or by the State
agency involved through a legislative appropriation. 3 Despite approval of a claim by both the court and the Legislature, there is
no guarantee that it will eventually be paid. Because approval by
both entities provides the claimant with no assurance that his
grievance will be automatically satisfied, 4 he may need to pursue
additional legal routes to force the Auditor or State agency to pay
the approved claim. A writ of mandamus can be obtained to require the Auditor to comply with the decision of the court and the
Legislature. This procedure
was utilized in the case of State ex rel.
65
Stollings v. Gainer.
Second, the court of claims and the Legislature may disagree
on the validity of a claim. The court can approve the claim, and
the subcommittee members in either house can remove it at their
discretion from the claims bill, thereby denying satisfaction to the
aggrieved party. Even though a claim has not been considered by
the court, the subcommittee members can add the claim to the
claims bill. Individual legislators can submit claims from their
constituents to the subcommittees for their consideration and possible inclusion in the claims bill. 66
ANN. § 14-2-19,-20 (1972 Replacement Volume).
12-3-1 (1972 Replacement Volume) provides for payment
of claims against the State and specifies that the auditor shall "examine the claim,
and the vouchers, certificates and evidence, if any, offered in support thereof, and
for so much thereof as he shall find to be justly due from the State ... he shall
issue his warrant on the treasurer, specifying to whom and on what account the
money mentioned therein is to be paid, and to what appropriation the same is to
be charged." The West Virginia court has supported the exercise of discretion by
the auditor in allowing or rejecting claims. See Robinson v. La Follette, 46 W. Va.
565, 33 S.E. 288 (1899). Although this particular case contains language stating that
mandamus will not lie to compel the auditor to allow a claim, a more recent case,
State ex rel. Stollings v. Gainer, 153 W. Va. 484, 170 S.E.2d 817 (1969), indicates
that mandamus proceedings have been successfully maintained to compel payment
by the auditor.
153 W. Va. 484, 170 S.E.2d 817 (1969).
"6W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39, provides that "in no case shall a special act be
passed, where a geberal law would be proper, and can be made applicable to the
"W.

.64W.

case. .

VA. CODE

VA. CODE ANN. §

. ." By

its actions in approving privately introduced claims, the Legislature

is apparently passing special laws which benefit private individuals rather than the

general public. Although the existence of this practice has been acknowledged by
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State ex rel. Stolings v. Gainer involved the resolution of a
difference of opinion between the court of claims and the Legislature. 7 In a mandamus proceeding brought against the State Auditor, who refused to pay a claim when there was a difference in the
decisions rendered by the court and the Legislature, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals allowed new evidence to be introduced and used in determining the validity of the claim. The court
justified its review of the determination of the court of claims on
the ground that it involved a judicial question-the question of
whether a moral obligation on the part of the State existed.
Stollings offers a potential procedural remedy for a claimant whose
situation is similar factually. If a claim has been rejected by the
court of claims and approved by the Legislature, a writ of mandamus will lie to compel the State Auditor to provide payment. The
doctrine of Stollings might also apply when a claim has been inserted in a claims bill by a subcommittee without consideration by
the court of claims, but probably only where a refusal to pay was
also involved which necessitated the bringing of a mandamus proceeding to elicit payment.
Finally, both the court of claims and the Legislature can reject
a claim. Whether a claimant can then pursue his claim in the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and bring in additional evidence to support its validity, as was done in Stollings, or whether
Stollings will be confined to its particular fact situation, is an
the court in case law-State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d
805 (1947)-its constitutionality is questionable.
11153 W. Va. 484, 170 S.E.2d 817 (1969). Marilyn Stollings brought a claim
against the State Road Commission for injuries sustained by her when the car she
was driving slid off the highway. The road was covered with an experimental type
of surface material which became extremely slick when wet. The court of claims
denied the claim on the ground that the claimant was contributorily negligent in
failing to drive at a speed commensurate with the road condition. The Legislature
approved the bill as part of an omnibus claims bill. The State Auditor, upon receipt
of a requisition from the State Road Commission to pay the claim, refused to honor
the requisition until the judiciary resolved the inconsistency between the decisions
of the court of claims ane the Legislature. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, in considering the matter, allowed new evidence concerning the circumstances of the accident to be introduced. In overruling the State Auditor's objection
to this additional evidence, the court justified its conduct by categorizing the case
as an extraordinary proceeding to be governed by its own rules and not bound by
the procedural requirements involved in an appeal or review of the findings of the
court of claims. Thus, new exhibits and affidavits were deemed to be proper matters
for consideration by the court in deciding to award a writ of mandamus to compel
the State Auditor to honor the claim.
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unanswered question.68
The procedural uncertainties which underlie the present court
of claims system have a debilitating effect on the court as a resource powerful enough in and of itself for obtaining satisfaction
of claims against the State. Two other aspects serve further to limit
its effectiveness in dealing with many claims now barred by immunity. Although the court has jurisdiction over claims against
the State and State agencies, the definition of State agency given
in the statute granting jurisdiction to the court is restricted to
include only boards and commissions directly connected with the
State and specifically excludes some entities that the courts have
otherwise recognized as State agencies. 9 In addition, an expansion
of court of claims jurisdiction by the Legislature would still not
result in a guaranteed means of providing satisfaction of claims
because a second aspect of the system-its discretionary nature-would remain unchanged. The recognition of a moral obligation and the amount of public funds to be appropriated to satisfy
such an obligation are decisions made on a case by case basis. The
court of claims is not specifically required to grant relief in any
particular situations or amounts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Two possible approaches to the question of governmental
immunity in West Virginia should be considered. The traditional
doctrine may be retained intact, or it can be abrogated as an antiquated concept which is inconsistent with modem views of governmental responsibilities. Governmental immunity, as embodied in
the constitution and case law of West Virginia, appears to be solidly entrenched. Some inroads have been made, however, which
offer prospects for limiting the immunity granted to the State and
its agencies.
The court has evidenced a willingness to stifle the far-reaching
effects of the governmental immunity doctrine by recognizing distinctions in the types of activities performed by governmental sub"Arguably, the only basis for the court's involvement in the consideration of
the claim in Stollings was because a mandamus proceeding was required by the
State Auditor's refusal to pay the claim. If the court's purpose was to compel the
performance of a mandatory duty by the State Auditor rather than to provide the
unsatisfied claimant with an additional remedy, then Stollings may be limited to
its facts.
"W.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 14-2-13 (1972 Replacement Volume).
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divisions and agencies. These distinctions have been employed by
the court as devices for avoiding the bar of immunity and providing recovery for injured claimants. Aside from the fact that many
of these distinctions are based on semantical differences, the utilization of this method for avoiding immunity has the effect of eroding immunity on a case by case basis.
The Legislature has also taken steps to provide for recovery by
recognizing the moral obligation of the State to an aggrieved party.
The creation of the court of claims and the immunity waiver provision of the State insurance statute manifest a realization that there
are certain claims which ought justly to be paid.
The crux of the problem involved in abrogating the doctrine
of governmental immunity in West Virginia lies in the fact that it
is embodied in the State constitution. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals is incapable of reaching its very source and can
only seek to erode it on a piecemeal basis. Therefore, the arguments in support of abrogation must be presented to the legislators
and the voting public.
Cynthia L. Turco
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